

# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An analysis of current international events*



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## ***How Can U.S. Policy Exploit Russia's Weaknesses?***

The proclamation by President Truman of a state of national emergency on December 16 has left the American people and the peoples of other nations in no doubt as to the seriousness with which the United States views the crisis in world affairs; which, in the words of the President, has been brought about by the actions of the Soviet Union. The proclamation itself, however, has not yet resolved the various doubts and questions about American foreign policy which have arisen in the wake of the Korean setback. The issue of what the United States and the United Nations can or should do with respect to Russia and China remains the subject of world-wide debate.

In this debate American public opinion has oscillated sharply between extreme optimism and extreme pessimism. At one moment Russia is regarded as a backward country ruled by a ruthless, ill-informed dictatorship, which has stifled all initiative and has thereby rendered a population of 200 million incapable of resisting the combined pressure of internal tensions and external "containment" by the free world. The next moment Russia is represented as a mighty industrial nation whose dictatorial rulers, endowed with supernatural shrewdness, are capable of leading not only the peoples of the U.S.S.R. but also of Europe and Asia from one victory to another until the final objective of subjugating the United States has been achieved. Which of these conflicting pictures of Russia is accurate? Which is false? What is the strength of the two powers?

The material factors of United States strength are its industrial production, ac-

tual and potential, to which must be added the industrial production of Western Europe, particularly if Western Germany is included in the North Atlantic coalition; command of naval power; and possession of a stockpile of atomic bombs and of bomb production facilities. The U.S.S.R., at present, is relatively weak in these respects as compared with the United States, its most vulnerable points being a comparatively low level of steel production and a paucity of oil. The material factors of U.S.S.R. strength are large land forces, which can be supplemented by the land forces of China and the small but well-trained armies of Poland and Czechoslovakia. The United States, even with the close cooperation of the Western nations, cannot match the U.S.S.R. on land.

### ***Strength of Freedom***

The most important source of non-material strength for the United States is its support of human freedoms. This factor cannot be diminished by Russia. It can be diminished only by the United States if this country, through fear of communism, whittles down traditional liberties here and seeks the aid of individuals and groups only recently committed to fascism in a proclaimed struggle for freedom and democracy against communism. The most important source of nonmaterial weakness for the U.S.S.R. is its disregard of human freedoms. This weakness cannot be remedied unless the Soviet government tempers or abandons some of the practices of dictatorship. Its importance as a factor in world affairs, however, can be effectively reduced if,

meanwhile, the United States should become associated in underdeveloped countries with anti-Communist elements which have no concern with liberty or welfare.

Taking these various factors as the materials with which the United States must work, what course can the American people henceforth follow in world affairs? Without indulging in recriminations about past mistakes or in daydreams about what might be ideally desirable, the United States now appears to have a choice of two courses.

The first course, advocated by General Douglas MacArthur, Senator William F. Knowland, Republican of California, and a number of other leading Republicans in Congress, is to pursue the Truman Doctrine of opposing Russia and communism throughout the world to its logical conclusion. This would mean that the United States, instead of nibbling around the edges of the Asian mainland in Korea and Indo-China, should go directly to the heart of the problem and attack the territory of China with the aim of overthrowing the government of Communist leader Mao Tse-tung. The advocates of this policy have been consistent in urging the United States to give all-out aid to Chiang Kai-shek and to bring him and his Nationalist forces, now on Formosa, back to the mainland. They have not demanded that the United States go to the ultimate end that always must be envisaged under the Truman Doctrine—and that is, if necessary, war on the U.S.S.R., viewed as the fountainhead of communism.

If the United States should decide to follow this course, the consequences must

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be weighed in advance as carefully as possible—not left to chance as proved to be the case in the Korean war. At present two variations of this course are under discussion—"unlimited" and "limited" war on Communist China. For the time being, at least, unlimited war is opposed both by our European allies and by the independent Asian nations, while the possibility of Chiang's return to power is viewed with hostility even by anti-Communist Asians. Should the United States decide to choose the alternative of unlimited war it would have to take the risk of playing a lone hand in Asia.

But, assuming that the alternative selected is that of limited war, in which the United States would use only naval and air forces, with or without the atomic bomb, this country would presumably have to operate from bases in Japan and might find it necessary to bolster its Pacific position by rearming the Japanese. Should these developments occur, the Russo-Chinese alliance of 1950, under which the U.S.S.R. undertook to aid China against an attack launched by any nation which has the support of Japan, would go into operation. Since it is just as feasible for Russian planes to bomb Japan from Siberia as it is for American planes to bomb China from Japan, the limited war would involve the risk of becoming a full-scale war between the United States and the U.S.S.R. in Asia. Another, still more restricted, version of limited war which has gained strong support in Washington would have the United States impose a naval blockade and economic sanctions on Communist China. However, the use of naval forces, if these operate from Japanese bases, would still leave open the possibility of direct armed intervention by Russia on behalf of China.

Meanwhile, in Europe the decision to arm Western Germany—if it is accepted by the Germans, which at present appears doubtful—would provide the U.S.S.R. with an opportunity to rally the Russian people in a struggle against the menace of a revived German militarism under Western direction. The risk must be taken, moreover, that even the most disaffected people in the countries of Eastern Europe—if faced with a choice between a rearmed German nation which would unquestionably seek sooner or later to recover territories it lost in the East, and continued if unwilling support of the U.S.S.R., which would then emerge as the only bulwark against a new Ger-

man *Drang nach Osten*—would have little choice but to cling to Moscow. Still more far-reaching would be the psychological reaction of all middle-of-the-road people in Europe and Asia who have become increasingly alienated by the willingness of the United States to support reactionary elements which in the recent past collaborated with the Nazis and the Japanese militarists.

### *Russia — or Communism?*

Another course, which has not yet crystallized, is gradually emerging from public discussions throughout this country following the Korean crisis. This course may seem at the moment the less bold of the two but actually would require far greater courage on the part of the United States. It would involve recognition of the practical limits of American power, and it would mean an effort to work out an affirmative policy within these limits. There is general agreement that the United States must have a military force adequately armed. But once the United States has armed might in being, what should it do? The following four points are being brought out in public discussions of foreign policy:

1. The United States could recognize the impossibility, at least under present circumstances, of undertaking a military struggle in Asia, whether "limited" or "unlimited." Most important of all, since it is acknowledged by military experts that the atomic bomb is a "limited purpose" weapon which would be a liability rather than an asset if used in Korea or China, the United States could make clear that it does not propose to use this weapon in Asia, reserving the decision about its use against Russia in case of direct aggression by the U.S.S.R. If, as American critics of the Peiping rulers contend, that regime is jeopardized by internal weaknesses and dissensions, these weaknesses and dissensions should be exploited by non-Communist Chinese leaders who would have to persuade the Chinese people to accept their alternatives to the doctrines and practices of communism on their own merits, not as mercenaries of the United States. The disputed island of Formosa, which the United States under the Cairo declaration promised to return to China, could as a transitional measure be placed under a United Nations trusteeship, preferably administered by Asian nations.

2. The United States should make un-remittingly clear that the struggle it is

waging is for freedom and democracy, not merely *against* communism. Unless it does so, its aid will continue to be solicited by individuals and groups whose sole claim to American support is their professed anticommunism. To avoid the disappointments and pitfalls of aid to Chiang Kai-shek, Syngman Rhee and Bao Dai in Asia, as well as some of the problems the United States is facing in Greece and Italy, Washington could insist that no further aid, economic or military, will be given to any regime which persists in refusing to undertake political, economic and social reforms—not reforms necessarily modeled on the American way of life but changes practicable within the framework of the regime's particular society.

The United States has already followed this course with respect to the Philippines in the penetrating report of the Bell mission. It could press similar demands in other areas, with particular emphasis in Asia on the need for land reforms. Unless it does this, it will be regarded by other peoples as a nation that is using its power to freeze the *status quo*. If it is argued that this would mean intervention by the United States, the answer is clear. The United States is unquestionably intervening in Europe and Asia. The question is whether it is to intervene, like Tsar Alexander I and Metternich in the nineteenth century, for the preservation of the existing order, or intervene in favor of reforms which are now demanded by the masses of the people and must be recognized by the West—and thereby wrest the initiative for revolution from the hands of Moscow.

3. If the United States is to achieve this objective, however, it would have to take the boldest step of all. It would have to dissociate, in its policy and propaganda, Russia as an imperialist state from communism as an ideology. It is conceivable that the United States could conduct a vigorous campaign against all imperialist encroachments by Russia and contain Russia as Britain succeeded in doing for two centuries. In such a campaign we could enlist, without a doubt, all countries of Europe and Asia which feel their territories and independence menaced by Russia—as has already proved true in the case of Yugoslavia.

But it is difficult to see how the United States could successfully wage a struggle against Communist ideology throughout the world—for communism has no definable frontiers, nor can ideas be killed

by weapons. If we continue to wage a total struggle against communism wherever it emerges, without offering practical alternatives of our own, we shall not merely push all convinced Communists, but also all hesitating people who want reforms as soon as possible, into the arms of the U.S.S.R. Thus with our own hands we shall help to consolidate the influence and power of Moscow.

If we could reconcile ourselves to the prospect of working with Communist groups and governments where they exist, provided they dissociate themselves from Moscow as Marshal Tito has done, we would deprive the Kremlin of the most powerful weapon in its armory. If this is regarded as appeasement, then one can only say that Britain "appeased" the French Revolution by accepting the fact that it would be impossible to prevent the spread of its ideas in Europe and the New World—and lived to achieve victory over the military might of French imperialism under Napoleon. Attempts to subvert existing Communist regimes and to restore the pre-Communist governments strengthen Communist extremism and Russia's hold on its neighbors. The Achilles heel of the U.S.S.R. is the deep-seated nationalism which is particularly notable in countries newly come to inde-

pendence and which affects even the most fervent Communists. We shall be unable to take advantage of this weakness if we persist in linking Russia with communism, as has been done under the Truman Doctrine.

4. The United States must not, because of disillusionment over the Korean setback, return to isolationism as the way out of the complex world problems it faces—whether isolationism within its own borders or, as a more popular version proposes, within the Western Hemisphere. For one thing, a large part of the Western Hemisphere—the twenty countries of Latin America—would not necessarily prove a strong bastion. Most of the countries of that area themselves suffer from economic and social maladjustments that foster communism, and few of them can boast of practicing democracy on the Western pattern, no matter how much they oppose communism. More important, however, is the paramount need for the United States to work through the United Nations if this country is to retain the leadership it has acquired since 1945. The United Nations must be used, for better or worse, in peacetime tasks of construction as well as in undertakings against aggression. Our acceptance of co-operation with the Asian countries on a

basis of equality within the United Nations is one of the most constructive results of the Korean crisis.

Samplings of public opinion in the Middle West and on the West Coast indicate that the American people view the international situation with a far greater degree of common sense, calmness and capacity for seeing the world in perspective than is sometimes apparent in Washington debates. In several important respects official policy is out of line with public opinion. The crying need is not for bipartisanship—for the Republican party is itself profoundly divided on foreign policy—but for a nonpartisan expression of public opinion. In view of the national emergency this country is facing, some kind of referendum to ascertain what the majority of the American people believe should be this country's policy would have the doubly salutary effect of providing a channel for the expression of considered views free from the passions of party elections and of giving both the Administration and the Republican opposition a trustworthy picture of the public will.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The second of two articles on the United States, the United Nations and Russia.)

## ***Korean Cease-Fire Talks Hinge on Broad World Issues***

The efforts of the UN's three-man committee to negotiate a cease-fire in Korea may determine whether or not a viable middle road exists between the grim alternatives of appeasement and all-out war. President Truman in his radio address to the nation on December 15 expressed this view when he said: "We will not engage in appeasement. . . . We are ready, as we always have been, to take part in efforts to reach a peaceful solution of the conflict in Korea."

In implementing this policy the United States has decided to continue a restricted military operation in Korea and to carry out economic sanctions against the Chinese mainland. Simultaneously it is putting into effect economic and military mobilization at home—pursuant to the President's proclamation of a national emergency on December 16—and is pressing for a build-up of the West's defense forces, in accordance with decisions reached this week at Brussels by the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic pact countries.

If there is to be no all-out effort to

drive the Chinese Communists from Korea, the apparent alternatives are a protracted war of attrition, final withdrawal of UN forces—either voluntarily or on the heels of military defeat—or a negotiated settlement. Taking the lead in an effort to bring about such a "peaceful solution" by discussion, 13 Asian and Middle Eastern states—led by India's Sir Benegal N. Rau—joined in submitting to the UN General Assembly a resolution, adopted 52 to 5 (the Soviet bloc) on December 14, which set up a committee of three "to determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea can be arranged." The committee—consisting of Assembly President Nasrallah Entezam of Iran, Canada's Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson and India's Sir Benegal—immediately began to discuss the problem with Peiping's representatives and American spokesmen.

### ***Immediate Choices***

The prospects appeared dim, however, for any agreement either on the immediate issue of a cease-fire or on broader po-

litical questions. Assuming for the moment a willingness on both sides to accept a cease-fire, the first obstacle to agreement would be the technical problem of devising a means of insuring observance. The United States would insist on having UN observers patrol both sides during the cease-fire period, following a pattern successfully utilized in the case of Palestine. The Communists—Chinese or Russian—however, have never yet shown any willingness to be watched by UN groups. Moreover, they do not recognize that the UN has any legitimate role in Korea.

Apart from such technical difficulties, both sides are likely to regard a cease-fire with suspicion. Peiping's representative, General Wu Hsiu-chuan, in a press statement on December 16, said that the real intention of the proposal was to tie the hands of the Chinese and North Koreans "so that the United States armed forces of aggression may continue their aggression in Korea." "Such a trap," he continued, "was set many times in China by Chiang Kai-shek with the help of General Marshall."



Historical analogies are often ambiguous. Referring to "peace talks" conducted by the Chinese Communists with the Nationalists in 1948 and those projected with the Tibetans in 1950, Christopher Rand in the December 17 New York *Herald Tribune* asserts that in each case the Peiping regime was willing to negotiate as an interim activity while grouping its forces for a renewed attack. He reaches the conclusion that the Chinese "want to drive the West from Korea; think they can do so and intend to in the end."

### Long-range Objectives

In sum the outlook for a cease-fire is dim indeed unless there can be prior agreement on broader objectives. Dealing with these long-range goals, the Arab-Asian group—with the exception of the Philippines—introduced a second resolution on the "situation in the Far East" calling for the establishment of a seven-nation commission to "make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of existing issues."

The United States, for its part, has insisted that the problem of Korea be settled independently. In his December 15 radio address President Truman said, "If negotiations are possible, we shall strive for a settlement that will make Korea a united, independent and democratic country. That is what the Korean people want, and that is what the United Nations has decided they are entitled to have."

Apart from the obvious difficulty of unifying Korea after a cease-fire which would again leave the country divided, the chief obstacle to negotiation is the insistence of Peiping on three simultaneous objectives: 1) withdrawal of United States forces from Korea; 2) termination of American protection of Formosa; and 3) admission of Peiping to the UN. General Wu has declared that on these conditions his government would "strive for a peaceful solution to the problem of the Far East," and "advise the Chinese volunteers to bring to an early conclusion the military operations which they have been forced to undertake."

Some observers, acting on the assumption that Peiping's policy is determined as much by Russian as by Chinese interests, consider that only conciliation with

Moscow on the German question could bring about a cease-fire in Korea. They point out that the Soviet note of December 16, reiterating Russian opposition to German rearmament, preceded not only the crucial North Atlantic discussions in Brussels, but also the Korean cease-fire negotiations.

The United States has, in the past, declared that it would not veto any UN decision to admit Peiping which had the requisite majority. Moreover, the President has stated that the Seventh Fleet would be withdrawn from Formosa when the Korean question had been settled. Conceivably, therefore, the main Chinese Communist demands could be met as corollaries of a Korean compromise, provided there were no directly stated bargain. Any direct acquiescence in Peiping's demands would be denounced as "appeasement" in this country and would doubtless strengthen the Administration's political opponents who are advocating a program of substantial assistance to the Nationalist government on Formosa.

Before dismissing any compromise as appeasement, however, the total world position of the United States must be evaluated. In view of the attitude of Britain, India and other countries—as well as the verdict of the White Paper on China—insistence on supporting Formosa might well alienate our allies without bringing about any change in the *de facto* government of China. Moreover, if UN membership is regarded, not as admission to a privileged club, but as acceptance of specific obligations, then the demand that the Chinese conform with UN decisions and international standards might perhaps be more effective after Peiping had been made a UN member. Short-run sacrifices, in other words, may be essential preconditions to building real strength in parts of the world where the people as a whole will support a determined effort to resist encroachment by Soviet imperialism.

FRED W. RIGGS

*Europe Unite*, by Winston S. Churchill, edited by Randolph S. Churchill. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950. \$5.

A collection of fifty-two of Mr. Churchill's speeches during 1947 and 1948 revealing him in his roles as Conservative party leader, critic of the Labor government on foreign, imperial and home affairs and spokesman for greater European unity.

### News in the Making

**HOW WILL PATEL'S DEATH AFFECT INDIA?** The death on December 15 of India's Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, political boss of the Congress party which, after achieving independence in 1947, has ruled the country as a one-party government, creates serious problems for India at a critical moment in its domestic and foreign affairs. Patel, regarded as the leader of the party's conservative wing, held the balance of power between the liberalism of Nehru and reactionary forces favorable to Hindu extremism. His death may cause a break-up of the party and a surge toward either Hindu extremism or communism.

**SUSPENSION OF AID TO BRITAIN:** Britain's recovery efforts and the increased earning power of the rest of the sterling area due to the rise in raw material prices have allowed the Economic Cooperation Administration to announce on December 13 the suspension of further Marshall aid to the United Kingdom. Despite Britain's present economic strength, both the ECA and London recognize that defense expenditures and rising prices for imports may bring about future setbacks.

**DISPUTE OVER THE SUDAN:** The Sudanese Legislative Assembly voted 39 to 38 on December 15 to ask Britain and Egypt for self-government in 1951. The territory athwart the upper Nile, administered as an Anglo-Egyptian condominium, has long been a source of friction between London and Cairo. The British regard the present independence movement as premature, and the Egyptians state that any eventual self-government for the Sudan should be under the sovereignty of the Egyptian crown.

**PROBLEMS IN LIBYA:** Economic difficulties as well as mass illiteracy and a lack of political maturity lead impartial observers to doubt if the Libyan territories of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan will be ready for independence by the end of 1951. Many Tripolitanians feel that independence will prove illusory unless a stable economy can be developed.